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Amel Belanes Aroui and Fatma Wyème Ben Mrad Douagi ()
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Amel Belanes Aroui: 20 bis 1er Etage Rue 8204 Cité Elkhadra 1003 Tunis, Tunisia and University of FSEGT, Tunisia

Chapter 20 in Risk Management and Value:Valuation and Asset Pricing, 2008, pp 511-539 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: AbstractThis research aims at pointing out the impact of some governance mechanisms susceptible to influence the managerial risk taking within the Tunisian firms. Therefore, we ought to highlight the specificities of these firms. On the basis of a 46-quoted firm sample observed over a one nine-year period spreading from 1996 to 2004, we draw out some interesting findings. First of all, the firm belonging to a financial industry, the State shareholding, the institutional shareholding, the concentration of the property as well as the accumulation of the functions of manager and chairman of board slow down the managerial risk taking within theTunisian enterprises. However, the industry-based rules and the participation of supervisors into the capital incite the risk taking of Tunisian managers. Furthermore, our results reveal that the latter is positively influenced by both the size and the growth potential of Tunisian firms.

Keywords: Risk; Value; Management; Derivatives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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