Auction Models

Matthew Shum

Chapter 6 in Econometric Models for Industrial Organization, 2017, pp 81-94 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: Goal of empirical work:We observe bids b1, … , bn, and we want to recover valuations v1, … , vn.Why? Analogously to demand estimation, we can evaluate the "market power" of bidders, as measured by the margin v – p.Interesting policy question: how fast does margin decrease as n (number of bidders) increases?Useful for the optimal design of auctions:What is auction format which would maximize seller revenue?What value for reserve price would maximize seller revenue?Methodology: identification, nonparametric estimation.

Keywords: Econometric Models; Industrial Organization; Discrete-Choice Demand Analysis; Models of Dynamic Behavior and Dynamic Games; Multiple Equilibria in Entry Games and Partial Identification; Auction Models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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