THE GLOBAL EXTERNALITY GAME I: ITS γ-CORE
Henry Tulkens
Chapter 5 in Economics, Game Theory and International Environmental Agreements:The Ca' Foscari Lectures, 2019, pp 129-186 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Abstract:
The following sections are included:The purpose and the messageIntroducing the global externality gameAssociating games with economic modelsFormulation of the global externality game (GEG)Antecedents: Select literature on games with environmental externalities prior to 2001Equilibrium concepts in the GEGNon-cooperative Nash equilibrium (NCNE)Behavioral economic and environmental characteristicsMathematical properties and their significanceExistenceUniquenessDominant strategy equilibriumCoalitions and UtilitiesCoalitionsTransferable vs. non-transferable utilityPartially cooperative Nash equilibria (PCNE)Mathematical propertiesExistenceUniquenessEnvironmental properties: Characteristics of the emissionsThe efficient outcomes of the GEGThe γ-coalitional functionThe Pareto efficient outcomeThe imputations set and alternative cooperative outcomesThe γ-core of the GEG: Definition and existence in a qualitative senseHelm’s balancedness resultNon-uniqueness and extensionsAnnexes to Lecture 5Annex 1: The “lake game” of Shapley and Shubik as a “global externality game”Annex 2: The “prisoners’ dilemma” game and international environmental externalitiesAnnex 3: The γ-coalitional function of the GEG is not superadditive: An exampleAnnex 4: A crucial step in Helm’s balancedness proof
Keywords: Environmental Economics; Environmental Externalities; Climate Change; Game Theory; γ-core; Dynamic Games; International Agreements; UNFCCC Process; Kyoto Protocol (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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