INTERNAL COALITIONAL STABILITY AND THE GLOBAL EXTERNALITY GAME

Henry Tulkens

Chapter 9 in Economics, Game Theory and International Environmental Agreements:The Ca' Foscari Lectures, 2019, pp 329-354 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: The following sections are included:The purpose and the messageAn alternative theory of coalitional stabilityThe “internal and external” stability concepts: An informal presentationInternal coalitional stability in the GEGCoalitional externality and coalitional free ridingThe equilibrium size of the coalitional externality“Outside option payoff” and possible outcomes of negotiationsProperties of an equilibrium with one free riding playerEquilibria with multiple free riding players: ProblemsAn existence issueA chain of contradictory expectationsAnalytical exploration of more general casesNumerical experiments with CWSConcluding considerationsOn the scope of the internal coalitional stability conceptOn achieving cooperation: By surplus grabbing vs. surplus sharing?On internal vs. γ-core stability and efficiency

Keywords: Environmental Economics; Environmental Externalities; Climate Change; Game Theory; γ-core; Dynamic Games; International Agreements; UNFCCC Process; Kyoto Protocol (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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