Japan’s Regulatory Responses to Banking Crisis

Masami Imai

Chapter 6 in Achieving Financial Stability:Challenges to Prudential Regulation, 2017, pp 63-77 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: Documenting how governments around the world have responded to banking crises and how their regulatory responses affected the performance of banking systems and the speed of economic recovery is of interest to academics and policymakers alike. Studying the history of past banking crises can shine light on a number of critical questions. Do politicians and regulators have incentives to unleash market discipline and allow it to play an important role in safeguarding seemingly fragile banking systems? If market discipline fails, do they have the ability and willingness to apply stringent, rule-based, regulatory discipline on problem banks? What are the economic consequences of regulatory forbearance?…

Keywords: Money and Banking; International Banking; Financial Instititions; Banks; Regulations; Compliance; Financial Crisis; Great Financial Crisis 2008; Microprudential; Macroprudential; Financial Stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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