Tariff bindings and bilateral cooperation on export cartels

Bernard Hoekman and Kamal Saggi ()

Chapter 12 in Economic Analysis of the Rules and Regulations of the World Trade Organization, 2018, pp 283-298 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: Despite the negative international externalities that they generate, export cartels are legal in many countries. We use a repeated game approach to analyze cooperation between a low-income country (LIC) and its high-income country (HIC) trade partner where the HIC agrees to prevent its industry from organizing as an export cartel in return for a combination of improved market access (i.e. a tariff reduction) and a transfer from the LIC. If the LIC is subject to a tariff binding (say because of an existing trade agreement), the transfer it pays to the HIC increases and the scope for bilateral cooperation declines.

Keywords: Multilateral Trading System; Trade Agreements; Trade Liberalization; International Tariff Cooperation; WTO Disputes; Case Studies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Journal Article: Tariff bindings and bilateral cooperation on export cartels (2007)
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