Repeated Games

George Mailath

Chapter 7 in Modeling Strategic Behavior:A Graduate Introduction to Game Theory and Mechanism Design, 2019, pp 167-218 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: The following sections are included:Perfect MonitoringThe Stage GameThe Repeated GameSubgame PerfectionAutomataRenegotiation-Proof EquilibriaShort-Lived Players and Modeling Competitive AgentsApplicationsEfficiency Wages ICollusion Under Demand UncertaintyEnforceability, Decomposability, and a Folk TheoremImperfect Public MonitoringEfficiency Wages IIPublic Perfect EquilibriaAutomataProblems

Keywords: Game Theory; Microeconomics; Mathematical Economics; Econometrics; Mechanism Design; Nash Equilibrium; Dynamic Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D00 D02 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/9789813239944_0007 (application/pdf)
https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/9789813239944_0007 (text/html)
Ebook Access is available upon purchase.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789813239944_0007

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in World Scientific Book Chapters from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().