CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS AS SIGNALING AND COMMITMENT DEVICES

Angelo Baglioni

Chapter 8 in Banking and Capital Markets:New International Perspectives, 2010, pp 201-221 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: AbstractThe following sections are included:IntroductionRelated LiteratureThe Theory of Corporate BoardsEmpirical EvidenceA Basic Model with Moral Hazard and Adverse SelectionGovernance Regulation as a Commitment DeviceSelf-Regulation as a Separating ToolConcluding Remarks: Empirical ImplicationsAppendixEndnotesReferences

Keywords: Financial Crises; Bank Lending; Corporate Governance; Equity Costs; International Joint Ventures; Value-at-Risk; Cross-Border Acquisitions; Cross-Country Listings; Buyout Activity; Spillover Effects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/9789814273619_0008 (application/pdf)
https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/9789814273619_0008 (text/html)
Ebook Access is available upon purchase.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814273619_0008

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in World Scientific Book Chapters from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().