Rivalry in Formation of Social Capital in Networks and Endogenous Social Norms

Partha Gangopadhyay

Chapter 4 in Economics of Rivalry, Conflict and Cooperation, 2010, pp 107-125 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: AbstractThe following sections are included:IntroductionA Modeling of Social Capital and Formation of Group NormsThe main intuitionPreliminariesManagerial Returns from Firm Size and U-Shaped Costs: Fragility and Indeterminacy of Equilibrium IntegrationSufficient condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium integration and its stability propertiesBifurcation of the equilibriumThe supermodular game of social capital and extremal equilibria and indeterminacyDiscussionConclusion

Keywords: Globalization, Scarcity of Resources, Game Theory; , Interactive Decision-Making, Equilibrium Behaviour, Nash Equilibria, Stability of Nash Equilibria, Rivalry, Costly Conflict, Cooperation, (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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