The Art of Central Banking and Policy Conflicts

Partha Gangopadhyay

Chapter 9 in Economics of Rivalry, Conflict and Cooperation, 2010, pp 215-238 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: AbstractThe following sections are included:IntroductionEvolution of Central BankingInescapable PitfallsInflationary bias and the conflict between rules and discretionThe trade-off between inflation and growthOn the presumed inverse relationship between central bank independence and inflationOptimal Contract and IndependenceActivism Price Stability and AccountabilityActivism and anticipatory monetary policyThe rationale for a dose of secrecy in central bankingIndependence Without Accountability: The Road to Conflicts and Central Bank “Bashing”Concluding Comments

Keywords: Globalization, Scarcity of Resources, Game Theory; , Interactive Decision-Making, Equilibrium Behaviour, Nash Equilibria, Stability of Nash Equilibria, Rivalry, Costly Conflict, Cooperation, (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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