DYNAMIC GAMES IN TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS

Ngo Long

Chapter 4 in A Survey of Dynamic Games in Economics, 2010, pp 107-136 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: AbstractThis chapter surveys dynamic game models in international economics and development economics. Section 4.1 is devoted to the effects of exogenously set trade policies (such as voluntary export restraints, quotas, export taxes or subsidies, trade liberalization) on welfare and profits when the market is dominated by international oligopolists that play a dynamic game. Section 4.2 shifts the focus to dynamic games played by two national governments: the classic problem of optimal tariffs and retaliation is examined in the light of the concept of feedback Nash equilibrium, and related equilibrium concepts in dynamic games. Section 4.3 deals with the issue of time-inconsistency of trade policies when a government acts as an open-loop Stackelberg leader, and setting tariffs against competitive foreign suppliers, to exploit terms of trade gain, or to encourage domestic investment. It also deals with ways to achieve time-consistent policies. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 deal with models of trade policies in the presence of an exhaustible resource. Some dynamic game models pertinent to development economics are reviewed in Section 4.6.

Keywords: Dynamic Games; Differential Games; Game Theory; Feedback Control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/9789814293044_0004 (application/pdf)
https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/9789814293044_0004 (text/html)
Ebook Access is available upon purchase.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814293044_0004

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in World Scientific Book Chapters from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().