DYNAMIC GAMES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

Ngo Long

Chapter 5 in A Survey of Dynamic Games in Economics, 2010, pp 137-171 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: AbstractThe theory of industrial organization has benefited much from dynamic game-theoretic models of interactions among firms, as well as those between firms on the one hand and far-sighted consumers on the other. In Section 5.1, we review models of dynamic duopoly where the state variables are maybe sticky prices, or sticky quantities, or capital stocks. Section 5.2 considers some extensions of the dynamic oligopoly models. Section 5.3 turns to models of R&D races and technology adoption.

Keywords: Dynamic Games; Differential Games; Game Theory; Feedback Control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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