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An Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty

Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris

Chapter 7 in Robust Mechanism Design:The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, 2012, pp 253-262 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: AbstractThe important role of dynamic auctions, in particular ascending price auctions, for the revelation of private information has been recognized for a long time. The advantage of sequential procedures is the ability to reveal and communicate private information in the course of the mechanism. The revelation of private information can decrease the uncertainty faced by the bidders and ultimately improve the final allocation offered by the mechanism. In auctions, the source of the uncertainty can be payoff uncertainty (about others’ payoff relevant information) or strategic uncertainty (about their bidding strategies)….

Keywords: Mechanism Design; Game Theory; Auction Theory; Implementation; Private Information; First and Higher-Order Belief; BayesNash Equilibrium; Ex Post Equilibrium; Rationalizability; Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms; Private Value; Interdependent Value; Common Value; Belief-Free Mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Journal Article: An Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty (2007) Downloads
Working Paper: An Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty (2007) Downloads
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