Voter Preferences for Trade Policy Instruments

Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman

Chapter 11 in International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, 2013, pp 169-183 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: AbstractWe analyze voter preferences for tariffs and production subsidies. The distribution of tax revenues argument shows that voters with high direct tax burdens prefer tariffs to subsidies. The uncertainty argument demonstrates that if actual tariff and subsidy rates are chosen from the set of individually optimal rates then the range of tariff rates is smaller than the range of subsidy rates. Thus, tariffs might be preferred even though they are less efficient. Finally, the large country argument shows that if a country is large then voters whose income shares decline with more protection prefer tariffs to subsidies.

Keywords: International Trade; Political Economy; Theory of International Free Trade Agreements; Customs Unions; Tariff Dynamics; Storable Votes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Related works:
Journal Article: VOTER PREFERENCES FOR TRADE POLICY INSTRUMENTS* (1990)
Working Paper: Voter Preference for Trade Policy Instruments (1990)
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