EXISTENCE OF CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA

Sergiu Hart and David Schmeidler

Chapter 1 in Simple Adaptive Strategies:From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, 2013, pp 3-14 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: AbstractAn elementary proof, based on linear duality, is provided for the existence of correlated equilibria in finite games. The existence result is then extended to infinite games, including some that possess no Nash equilibria.

Keywords: Game Theory; Dynamics; Equilibrium; Nash Equilibrium; Correlated Equilibrium; Adaptive Dynamics; Simple Strategies; Regret-Based Strategies; Uncoupled Dynamics; Bounded Rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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