UNCOUPLED DYNAMICS DO NOT LEAD TO NASH EQUILIBRIUM

Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell

Chapter 7 in Simple Adaptive Strategies:From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, 2013, pp 153-163 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: AbstractThe following sections are included:The ModelAn Example with a Continuum of StrategiesAn Example with Finitely Many StrategiesDiscussionAppendixReferences

Keywords: Game Theory; Dynamics; Equilibrium; Nash Equilibrium; Correlated Equilibrium; Adaptive Dynamics; Simple Strategies; Regret-Based Strategies; Uncoupled Dynamics; Bounded Rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead to Nash Equilibrium (2003)
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