ADAPTIVE HEURISTICS

Sergiu Hart

Chapter 11 in Simple Adaptive Strategies:From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, 2013, pp 253-287 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: AbstractWe exhibit a large class of simple rules of behavior, which we call adaptive heuristics, and show that they generate rational behavior in the long run. These adaptive heuristics are based on natural regret measures, and may be viewed as a bridge between rational and behavioral viewpoints. Taken together, the results presented here establish a solid connection between the dynamic approach of adaptive heuristics and the static approach of correlated equilibria.

Keywords: Game Theory; Dynamics; Equilibrium; Nash Equilibrium; Correlated Equilibrium; Adaptive Dynamics; Simple Strategies; Regret-Based Strategies; Uncoupled Dynamics; Bounded Rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Related works:
Journal Article: Adaptive Heuristics (2005)
Working Paper: Adaptive Heuristics (2004)
Working Paper: Adaptive Heuristics (2004)
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