Extension of the Nucleolus to Nontransferable Utility Games in Partition Function Form

Roger McCain

Chapter 5 in Value Solutions in Cooperative Games, 2013, pp 85-103 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: AbstractThe following sections are included:ExcessThe NucleolusUniquenessCharacterizing the CoreThe Intermediate Case and Proper GamesExtended CoreSuperior GamesThe Example of a Common-Property ResourceThe Example of a CartelSummary and Conclusions

Keywords: Cooperative Games; Value; Imputation; Bargaining Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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