An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games

Adam Brandenburger and H. Jerome Keisler

Chapter 1 in The Language of Game Theory:Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, 2014, pp 1-30 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: A paradox of self-reference in beliefs in games is identified, which yields a game-theoretic impossibility theorem akin to Russell's Paradox. An informal version of the paradox is that the following configuration of beliefs is impossible:Ann believes that Bob assumes thatAnn believes that Bob's assumption is wrongThis is formalized to show that any belief model of a certain kind must have a “hole.” An interpretation of the result is that if the analyst's tools are available to the players in a game, then there are statements that the players can think about but cannot assume. Connections are made to some questions in the foundations of game theory.

Keywords: Game Theory; Epistemic Game Theory; Foundations; Applied Mathematics; Social Neuroscience; Rationalizability; Nash Equilibrium; Probability; Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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