Self-Admissible Sets

Adam Brandenburger and Amanda Friedenberg

Chapter 8 in The Language of Game Theory:Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, 2014, pp 213-249 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: Best-response sets (Pearce [1984]) characterize the epistemic condition of “rationality and common belief of rationality.” When rationality incorporates a weak-dominance (admissibility) requirement, the self-admissible set (SAS) concept (Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler [2008]) characterizes “rationality and common assumption of rationality.” We analyze the behavior of SAS's in some games of interest — Centipede, the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, and Chain Store. We then establish some general properties of SAS's, including a characterization in perfect-information games.

Keywords: Game Theory; Epistemic Game Theory; Foundations; Applied Mathematics; Social Neuroscience; Rationalizability; Nash Equilibrium; Probability; Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Journal Article: Self-admissible sets (2010)
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