Reducing Congestion Through Information Design

Sanmay Das, Emir Kamenica and Renee Mirka

Chapter 7 in Bayesian Persuasion, 2025, pp 165-176 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: We consider the problem of designing information in games of uncertain congestion, such as traffic networks where road conditions are uncertain. Using the framework of Bayesian persuasion, we show that suitable information structures can mitigate congestion and improve social welfare.

Keywords: Bayesian Persuasion; Economic Theory; Information Economics; Information Design; Disclosure; Game Theory; Strategic Communication; Disclosure Regulation; Persuasion Games; Political Economy; Economic Behavior; Information Revelation; Collusion; Competition; Congestion; Manipulation of Beliefs; Rating Systems; Optimization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C01 C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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