Voting Schemes in DAO Governance

Qinxu Ding, Weibiao Xu, Zhiguo Wang and David Kuo Chuen Lee

Chapter 8 in Reviews and Advances in Fintech I, 2025, pp 105-122 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: This paper aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the different voting schemes used in DAO governance. We will examine the various features of these schemes and compare their differences. We propose a new hypothetical voting mechanism specifically designed for decentralized and permissionless DAO governance. This new scheme, which incorporates incentive designs, is intended to be more efficient than existing schemes and can be easily adapted to a permissioned scenario. Through this examination and proposal, we hope to contribute to the ongoing discourse on how to govern decentralized autonomous organizations effectively.

Keywords: Fintech; Blockchain; Decentralized Finance; DeFi; Decentralized Autonomous Organizations; DAOs; Green Finance; Cross-Chain Protocols; NFTs; Innovation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G23 G32 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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