Authority in International Relations: Contracted, Inscribed, or Reflexive?

Michael Zürn

A chapter in Rule in International Politics, 2023, pp 33-60 from ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Abstract: In this chapter, authority and rule are considered as analytical concepts to capture different forms of domination based on recognition. Both concepts involve the social paradox of voluntary subordination, particularly evident concerning global governance and International Organizations (IOs). The chapter discusses three theoretical solutions to the social paradox, thus three conceptualizations of authority. While contracted authority and inscribed authority represent the dominant conceptions in IR, they suffer from several shortcomings. Building on a critique of these variants, the chapter introduces reflexive authority as a third response, which understands authority in global governance as deriving from epistemic foundations that include the permanent monitoring of authorities. Reflexive authority relations involve enlightened and critical subordinates recognizing authority because they acknowledge their limitations. Instead of commands, authority holders send requests to constituencies, who monitor the authorities closely. This recognition of authority as worth observing leads to deference. Primary forms of contestations include non-compliance, delegitimation, and dissidence, which aim at different targets.

Keywords: Reflexive authority; contracted authority; inscribed authority; epistemic authority; rule; dominance; legitimacy; international organizations; global governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/342570/1/F ... tional-relations.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:eschap:342570

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in EconStor Open Access Book Chapters from ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().