The Impact of Other-Regarding Preferences on Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

Thomas Daske ()

in EconStor Theses from ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Abstract: This dissertation explores the role of other-regarding preferences in the form of altruism, spite, or status considerations in the resolution of adverse selection and moral hazard. Two chapters reflect upon the implications of asymmetric information on other-regarding preferences for incentive mechanism design in general and human resource management in specific. A third chapter reflects upon how moral hazard in the presence of other-regarding preferences may generate and shape people’s ethical convictions regarding their abidance by social norms and formal law. Implications for public economic policy are drawn.

Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:esthes:172508

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