Stable Agreements in Infinitely Repeated Games

Licun Xue ()

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University

Abstract: This paper studies infinitely repeated games where players can form coalitions to coordinate their actions via self-enforcing agreements. The proposed notion of "stable agreements" extends a characterization of the set of subgame perfect equilibrium paths by Greenberg (1989, 1990) to account for self-enforcing coalitional deviations. An agreement is stable if no coalition can deviate in such a way that by solely coordinating the actions of its own members, it guarantees a higher payoff for each member. Existence of the proposed notion is established and its relation to other notions is investigated.

Keywords: Repeated games; renegotiation; self-enforcing agreements; coalitions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Stable agreements in infinitely repeated games (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aah:aarhec:2000-13

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