Information Exchange, Market Transparency and Dynamic Oligopoly

Per Overgaard () and Peter Møllgaard

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University

Abstract: Economic literature often offers conflicting views on the likely efficiency effects of information exchanges, communication between firms, and market transparency. On the one hand, it is argued that increased information dissemination improves firm planning to the benefit of society (including buyers) and allows potential buyers to make correct decisions given their preferences. On the other hand, economic literature also shows that increased information dissemination can raise prices through tacit or explicit collusion to the benefit of firms but at the expense of society at large. This chapter provides a general analytical framework to reconcile these views and presents some basic conclusions for antitrust practice. In addition, the chapter reviews cases from both sides of the Atlantic where informational issues have played a significant role.

Keywords: Information exchange; oligopoly coordination; cases; antitrust practice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23
Date: 2007-04-25
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Information Exchange, Market Transparency and Dynamic Oligopoly (2006)
Working Paper: Information Exchange, Market Transparency and Dynamic Oligopoly (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aah:aarhec:2007-03

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