Competing Auctions of Skills

John Kennes and Daniel le Maire

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University

Abstract: We generalize McAfee’s (1993) game of competing sellers to the case of heterogeneous sellers. In the generalized McAfee (GM) game, the equilibrium expected job offer distribution of each worker (seller) type evolves over time as a function of stochastic events. We derive a tractable method of solving the GM game. We estimate, using non-parametric methods, a close fit between a benchmark GM game and a cross-section of Danish data on productivity and unemployment. The theoretical properties of the GM game, which relate to on-the-job search, assortative matching, aggregate and match specific shocks, and the equivalence of alternative games, are also characterized.

Keywords: Auctions; assortative matching; wage dispersion; aggregate shocks; on-the-job search (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E32 J63 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 54
Date: 2016-05-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-lab and nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Competing Auctions of Skills (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aah:aarhec:2016-02

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