On the equivalence of buyer and seller proposals within canonical matching and pricing environments

John Kennes and Daniel le Maire

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University

Abstract: This paper considers equilibrium proposals by either buyers or sellers in the canonical ‘urnball’ matching market. The proposals can either be posted prices announced by buyers; posted prices announced by sellers; or announcements by sellers (or by buyers) to entertain price proposals, as in auctions. We derive the expected revenue equivalence of these different modes of proposing in this canonical trading environment.

Keywords: Matching; pricing; frictions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D44 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12
Date: 2016-10-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aah:aarhec:2016-10

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