Share to Scare: Technology Sharing in the Absence of Strong Intellectual Property Rights
Jos Jansen ()
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Jos Jansen: Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University, Postal: Fuglesangs Alle 4, DK-8210 Aarhus V, Denmark
Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University
I study the incentives of Cournot duopolists to share their technologies with their competitor in markets where intellectual property rights are absent and imitation is costless. The trade-off between a signaling effect and an expropriation effect determines the technology-sharing incentives. In equilibrium, there tends to be at most one firm that shares technologies. For similar technology distributions, there exists an equilibrium in which nobody shares. If the technology distributions are skewed towards efficient technologies, then there may exist equilibria in which one firm shares all technologies, only the best technologies, or only intermediate technologies. Further, I consider several extensions.
Keywords: Cournot duopoly; strategic disclosure; indivisibility; innovation; trade secret; open source; skewed distribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 L13 L17 O32 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-ind, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-knm and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aah:aarhec:2023-04
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