Job Amenities in the Market for CEOs

Arnaud Dupuy (), John Kennes and Ran Sun Lyng ()
Additional contact information
Arnaud Dupuy: Department of Economics and Business Economics, University of Luxembourg
Ran Sun Lyng: Tampere University

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University

Abstract: We use a two-sided multidimensional matching model with imperfect transferable utility to estimate how CEOs/firms trade off preferred firm/CEO qualities against salary. These preferences are identifiable with data on CEO pecuniary compensation and assignment. We estimate the model with high-quality Danish data through maximum likelihood, accounting for CEO and firm fixed effects. The estimates reveal that CEOs have strong preferences for non-monetary job amenities that account for several puzzling features of the market for CEOs. The central role of CEO job preferences is also illustrated by several counterfactual experiments.

Keywords: Job amenities; CEO compensation; Assignment Models; CEO-firm matching; Multidimensional matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C35 C78 G30 G34 J32 M12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 55
Date: 2023-09-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-hrm, nep-lma and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://repec.econ.au.dk/repec/afn/wp/23/wp23_08.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aah:aarhec:2023-08

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().