Salaries and Work Effort: An Analysis of the European Union Parliamentarians
Naci Mocan and
Duha Altindag ()
No auwp2013-02, Auburn Economics Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Auburn University
Prior to July 2009, salaries of the members of the European Parliament were paid by their home country and there were substantial salary differences between parliamentarians representing different EU countries. Starting in July 2009, the salary of each member of the Parliament is pegged to 38.5% of a European Court judge’s salary, paid by the EU. This created an exogenous change in salaries, the magnitude and direction of which varied substantially between parliamentarians. Parliamentarians receive per diem compensation for each meeting day attended during plenary sessions, but salaries constitute fixed income as they are independent of attendance to the Parliament. Using detailed information on each parliamentarian of the European Parliament between 2004 and 2011 we show that an increase in salaries reduces attendance to plenary sessions. An increase in salaries has also a negative impact on questions asked by parliamentarians in plenary sessions but it has no impact on other job-related activities.
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