Deregulation of Business

Evgeny Yakovlev and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya

No w0097, Working Papers from New Economic School (NES)

Abstract: What determines the enforcement of deregulation reform of business activities? What are the outcomes of deregulation? We address these questions using an episode of a drastic reform in Russia between 2001 and 2004 which liberalized registration, licensing, and inspections. Based on the analysis of micro-level panel data on regulatory burden, we find that: 1) On average, the reform reduced the administrative costs of firms; but, the progress of reform had a substantial geographical variation. 2) The enforcement of deregulation reform was better in regions with a transparent government, low corruption, better access of the public to independent media sources, a powerful industrial lobby, and stronger fiscal autonomy. 3) Using the exogenous variation in regulation generated by the interaction of reform and its institutional determinants, we find a substantial positive effect of deregulation on net entry and small business employment and no effect on pollution and public health. The results support public choice theory of the nature of regulation and are inconsistent with the predictions of public interest theory.

Pages: 48 pages
Date: 2007-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.nes.ru/files/Preprints-resh/WP97.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
Working Paper: Deregulation of Business (2007)
Working Paper: Deregulation of Business (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:abo:neswpt:w0097

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from New Economic School (NES) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Vladimir Ivanyukhin ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).