On Effciency of the English Auction

Oleksii Birulin () and Sergei Izmalkov ()
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Oleksii Birulin: University of Sydney
Sergei Izmalkov: New Economic School

No w0139, Working Papers from New Economic School (NES)

Abstract: We study efficiency properties of the irrevocable exit English auction in a setting with interdependent values. Maskin (1992) shows that the pairwise single-crossing condition is sufficient for efficiency of the English auction with two bidders and suggests that it is also a necessary condition. This paper clarifies and extends Maskin's results to the case of N bidders. We introduce the generalized single crossing condition - a fairly intuitive extension of the pairwise single-crossing condition - and prove that it is essentially a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an efficient equilibrium of the N-bidder English auction.

Keywords: English auction; efficient auction; ex post equilibrium; singlecrossing; interdependent values. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2009-11
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:abo:neswpt:w0139

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