Firm Value in Crisis: Effects of Firm-Level Transparency and Country-Level Institutions
Maria Petrova and
Sergey Stepanov ()
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Ruben Enikolopov: Institute for Advanced Study and the New Economic School
Sergey Stepanov: New Economic School
No w0184, Working Papers from New Economic School (NES)
Recent empirical research suggests that country-level and firm-level governance institutions are substitutes with respect to their effect on firm value. In this paper we demonstrate that these institutions may become complements once we look at the decline in firm’s value during a crisis. Specifically, we find that the decline in companies’ valuation during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 was more sensitive to firm-level transparency in countries with stronger investor protection. We propose a theoretical model that reconciles our findings with the results in the literature. In our model, during "normal times" strong firm-level governance is crucial to attract outside financing in countries with weak investor protection, but is less important in countries with good investor protection. During the crisis, however, corporate governance becomes important even in regimes with strong investor protection, and, as a result, relative importance of firm-level governance increases in countries with good investor protection.
Pages: 33 pages
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Journal Article: Firm value in crisis: Effects of firm-level transparency and country-level institutions (2014)
Working Paper: Firm Value in Crisis: Effects of Firm-Level Transparency and Country-Level Institutions (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:abo:neswpt:w0184
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