Self-Enforcing Trade Credit
Marta Troya-Martinez ()
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Marta Troya-Martinez: New Economic School
No w0240, Working Papers from New Economic School (NES)
Trade credit plays a very important role in inter-firm transactions. Because formal contracts are often unavailable, it is granted within an ongoing relationship. We characterize the optimal self-enforcing contract, when the ability to repay is unknown to the supplier and the threat of trade suspension is used to discipline the buyer. The optimal contract resembles a debt contract: if the fixed repayment is met, the contract is renewed. Otherwise, the supplier demands the highest feasible repayment and suspends trade for some time. The length of the trade suspension is contingent on the repayment. We provide a novel explanation for why the quantity is undersupplied, even when a repayment is met.
Keywords: Limited Enforcement; Trade Credit; Imperfect Monitoring; Debt Contract (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D82 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:abo:neswpt:w0240
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