Estimating Revenue Under Collusion-Proof Auctions

Gaurab Aryal () and Maria Gabrielli

ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics from Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics

Abstract: We propose a method to nonparametriclly estimate the revenue under a auction that is efficient and resilient to collusion [Chen and Micali, 2012]. Efficiency is achieved on account of a lower revenue and we propose a method to quantify this efficiency-revenue trade-off, i.e. the extra cost for which efficient allocation can be guaranteed even when bidders collude. We implement a local polynomial estimation method on sample of California highway procurements data and find that to achieve efficiency the cost of procurement must increase by at lest 10.8% and can go up to 48.8% depending on the size of bidding-ring.

JEL-codes: C14 C4 C7 D44 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 Pages
Date: 2012-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ecm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2012-597

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