Cost Shifting in Civil Litigation: A General Theory
Ben Chen and
ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics from Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics
We model civil litigation as a contest between a plaintiff and a defendant. A success function describes the litigants’ respective posterior probabilities of success based on their simultaneously-chosen efforts and an exogenous prior reflecting their relative advantages. The present success function satisfies general assumptions which capture frequently-used functional forms. These assumptions represent natural intuitions regarding the properties of reasonable success functions, and enable the results arising from the present model to reach a great degree of generality. Another generalization is the use of an exogenous proportion to characterize a cost-shifting rule that allows the winner to recover that proportion of her litigation costs from the loser. There exists a unique Nash equilibrium with positive efforts. In equilibrium, more cost shifting makes the outcome of the case more predictable, but may increase the litigants’ collective expenditure and decrease their collective welfare.
Keywords: cost shifting; legal predictability; litigation costs; legal accuracy; contest theory. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-law and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2017-651
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics from Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().