Patent Examination Decisions and Strategic Trade Behavior
Alfons Palangkaraya (),
Paul Jensen () and
Elizabeth Webster ()
No 2006-03, Centre for International Economic Studies Working Papers from University of Adelaide, Centre for International Economic Studies
This paper examines whether strategic trade behavior can explain the fact that the US, Japanese and European Patent Offices Â– the USPTO, the JPO and the EPO Â– often make different decisions about whether to grant (or reject) a given patent application. We analyse this issue by considering whether examination decisions across the patent offices vary systematically by inventor nationality, patent quality and technology area using a matched sample of 33,305 non-PCT patent applications granted by the USPTO and subjected to examination decisions at the EPO and the JPO.
JEL-codes: F13 O31 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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