Regulation and Monitoring with Corrupt Bureaucrats

Richard Damania
Additional contact information
Richard Damania: School of Economics, University of Adelaide

No 1999-04, School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers from University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy

Abstract: Most regulatory government agencies to monitor the degree of compliance. These tasks are usually delegated to bureaucrats who, as self interested agents, may engage in corrupt behaviour. Opportunities for bribe taking are most likely to arise when the government (principle) is imperfectly informed about the degree of compliance, but the bureaucrats (agents) are fully informed. This paper outlines a strategy which may be employed to prevent corrupt behaviour.

Keywords: regulatory policy; corruption; environmental and resource economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H1 L5 Q2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 1999
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in Environment and Development Economics, 2002, vol. 7, pp. 407-427 as ''Environmental Controls with Corrupt Bureaucrats''

Downloads: (external link)
https://media.adelaide.edu.au/economics/papers/doc/wp1999-04.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adl:wpaper:1999-04

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers from University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Qazi Haque ().