More Strategies, More Nash Equilibria

Sophie Bade (), Guillaume Haeringer and Ludovic Renou
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Sophie Bade: Department of Economics, Penn State University

No 2005-01, School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers from University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy

Abstract: This short paper isolates a non-trivial class of games for which there exists a monotone relation between the size of pure strategy spaces and the number of pure Nash equilibria (Theorem). This class is that of two-player nice games, i.e., games with compact real intervals as strategy spaces and continuous and strictly quasi-concave payoff functions, assumptions met by many economic models. We then show that the sufficient conditions for Theorem to hold are tight.

Keywords: strategic-form games; strategy spaces; Nash equilibrium; two players (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2005-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: More strategies, more Nash equilibria (2007)
Working Paper: More strategies, more Nash equilibria (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adl:wpaper:2005-01

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