The Tragedy of the Commons in International Fisheries: An Empirical Examination

Stephanie McWhinnie

No 2007-05, School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers from University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy

Abstract: Historically, all capture fisheries have proven hard to manage; internationally shared stocks face an additional impediment to effective management. Previous fisheries studies estimate gains from cooperation for particular species or locations, but evidence is lacking on the wider effect that international sharing has in relation to other variables that affect stock status. This paper is an attempt to shed a broader light on the effect of sharing by identifying whether shared fish stocks are systematically more exploited. I compile exploitation status, biological and economic data into a unique two-period panel of more than two-hundred fish stocks from around the globe with which I test the theoretical implications of sharing. The empirical results from ordered category estimation suggest that shared stocks are indeed more prone to overexploitation.

Keywords: international fisheries; tragedy of the commons; exploitation status; ordered probit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2007-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, May 2009, pages 321-333

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Related works:
Journal Article: The tragedy of the commons in international fisheries: An empirical examination (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adl:wpaper:2007-05

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