Fairness in Auctions and Task Assignments

Duygu Yengin ()

No 2009-27, School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers from University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy

Abstract: We study the problem of allocating objects when monetary transfers are possible. We are interested in mechanisms that allocate the objects in an efficient way and induce the agents to report their true preferences. Within the class of such mechanisms, fist we characterize egalitarian-equivalent mechanisms. Then, we add a bounded-deficit condition and characterize the corresponding class. Finally, we investigate the relations between egalitarian- equivalence and other fairness notions such as no-envy.

Keywords: allocation of indivisible goods and money; fair auctions; task assignments; strategy-proofness; the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms; order preservation; egalitarian-equivalence; no-envy; egalitarianism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D61 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adl:wpaper:2009-27

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