Identical Preferences Lower Bound for Allocation of Heterogeneous Tasks and NIMBY Problems

Duygu Yengin ()

No 2011-27, School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers from University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy

Abstract: We study the allocation of collectively owned indivisible goods when monetary transfers are possible. We restrict our attention to incentive compatible mechanisms which allocate the goods efficiently. Among these mechanisms, we characterize those that respect the identical-preferences lower-bound: each agent should be at least as well off as in an hypothetical economy where all agents have the same preference as hers, no agent envies another, and the budget is balanced.

Keywords: welfare bounds; collective ownership; allocation of indivisible goods and money; NIMBY problems; imposition of tasks; the Groves mechanisms; the identical-preferences lower-bound; k-fairness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D61 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2011-07
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Journal Article: Identical Preferences Lower Bound for Allocation of Heterogenous Tasks and NIMBY Problems (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adl:wpaper:2011-27

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