Multiple Votes, Multiple Candidacies and Polarization
Arnaud Dellis () and
Mandar Oak ()
No 2013-02, School of Economics Working Papers from University of Adelaide, School of Economics
We use the citizen-candidate model to study the differential incentives that different voting rules provide for candidate entry, and their effect on policy polarization. In particular, we show that allowing voters to cast multiple votes leads to equilibria which support multiple candidate clusters. These equilibria are more polarized than those obtained under the Plurality Rule. We also show that equilibria under the Alternative Vote Rule do not exhibit multiple candidate clusters and they are less polarizing than those under the Plurality Rule. These results differ from those obtained in the existing literature, where the set of candidates is exogenous. Thus, our paper contributes to the scholarly literature as well as public debate on the merits of using alternative voting rules by highlighting the importance of endogenous candidacy.
Keywords: plurality; approval voting; citizen-candidate (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Journal Article: Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adl:wpaper:2013-02
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