Number of Sellers and Quantal Response Equilibrium Prices

Ralph-C Bayer () and Hang Wu ()
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Hang Wu: School of Economics, University of Adelaide

No 2013-15, School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers from University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy

Abstract: This paper studies the effects of increasing the number of sellers on Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) prices in homogeneous product Bertrand oligopoly markets. We show that the two most commonly used choice functions (power and logistic) lead to qualitatively different comparative-static predictions with respect to the relationship between number of firms and prices.

Keywords: Bertrand Oligopoly; Quantal Response Equilibrium; Comparative Statics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D83 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages.
Date: 2013-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adl:wpaper:2013-15

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