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Inspection, Compliance and Violation: A Case of Fisheries

Kofi Otumawu-Apreku

No 2013-17, School of Economics Working Papers from University of Adelaide, School of Economics

Abstract: The presence of illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing activities is considered a serious barrier to the sustainable use of marine resources. This paper uses a game theoretic approach to investigate the strategic interaction between fishers and management in the presence of IUU fishing. Managers choose a combination of fines, inspection probabilities and whether to classify a firm as group 1 or group 2, to induce a target level of compliance from fishers who choose whether or not to comply. Importantly, this paper finds that equilibrium compliance strategies of fishers affect stock levels over time. In particular, even using less than perfect monitoring and enforcement can lower illegal harvesting, which is beneficial for stocks. The paper further shows that increasing the cost of engaging in illegal activities, through punishment, may be a sound economic policy. The results, however, suggest that the punishment should be bounded in order to achieve the purpose for which it is intended.

Keywords: IUU fishing; game theoretic approach; inspection; violation and compliance; punishment; fish biomass; sustainability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 Q2 Q22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 57 pages.
Date: 2013-11
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