Coincidence of Cooperative Game Theoretic Solutions in the Appointment Problem

Youngsub Chun, Nari Park (flight21cj@gmail.com) and Duygu Yengin (duygu.yengin@adelaide.edu.au)
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Nari Park: Seoul National University

No 2015-09, School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers from University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy

Abstract: The fixed-route traveling salesman problem with appointments, simply the appointment problem, is concerned with the following situation. Starting from home, a traveller makes a scheduled visit to a set of sponsors and returns home. If a sponsor in the route cancels her appointment, the traveller returns home and waits for the next appointment. We are interested in finding a way of dividing the total traveling cost among sponsors in the appointment problem by applying solutions developed in the cooperative game theory. We show that the well-known solutions of the cooperative game theory, the Shapley value, the nucleolus (or the prenucleolus), and the t -value, coincide under a mild condition onthe traveling cost.

Keywords: Fixed-route traveling salesman problem; appointment problem; Shapley value; prenucleolus; nucleolus; t-value; coincidence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2015-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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