Endogenous Candidacy in Electoral Competition: A Survey
Arnaud Dellis () and
Mandar Oak ()
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Damien Bol: King's College, London
No 2015-19, School of Economics Working Papers from University of Adelaide, School of Economics
We survey the literature on electoral competition under plurality rule where candidacy decisions are endogenous. We organize the differentcontributions into three families based on the paradigm to which they belong and on the part of the set of candidates they endogenize. We argue that endoegenous candidacy offers both theoretical and empirical advantages over the standard Hotelling-Downs model. On the theoretical front, these models can provide a more satisfactory microfoundation for the emergence and/or stability of the two party system under plurality rule. On the empirical front these models offer a better account of the stylized facts about elections, particularly regarding Duverger's law and policy polarization. We also point to shortcomings of these models and propose some directions for future research.
Keywords: Energy; Rebound Effect; Own-price Elasticity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adl:wpaper:2015-19
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