Endogenous Candidacy in Electoral Competition: A Survey

Damien Bol, Arnaud Dellis and Mandar Oak
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Damien Bol: King's College, London

No 2015-19, School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers from University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy

Abstract: We survey the literature on electoral competition under plurality rule where candidacy decisions are endogenous. We organize the differentcontributions into three families based on the paradigm to which they belong and on the part of the set of candidates they endogenize. We argue that endoegenous candidacy offers both theoretical and empirical advantages over the standard Hotelling-Downs model. On the theoretical front, these models can provide a more satisfactory microfoundation for the emergence and/or stability of the two party system under plurality rule. On the empirical front these models offer a better account of the stylized facts about elections, particularly regarding Duverger's law and policy polarization. We also point to shortcomings of these models and propose some directions for future research.

Keywords: Energy; Rebound Effect; Own-price Elasticity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2015-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adl:wpaper:2015-19

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