International Fisheries Access Agreements and Trade
Tatyana Chesnokova () and
Stephanie McWhinnie ()
No 2017-11, School of Economics Working Papers from University of Adelaide, School of Economics
International fishery access agreements allow fishermen from one country to harvest fish in another country's waters. We empirically examine, using a unique global panel dataset, why countries sign fisheries access agreements with each other and compare these to the characteristics of countries that choose the path of international trade. We show that access agreements and fish exports are driven by two key motives: a pattern of comparative advantage in fishing, which depends on fish stocks and fishing capacities; and gravity factors of economic size and distance. Our results suggest that most gravity factors work similarly for agreements and exports: larger countries that are closer to each other are more likely to sign access agreements or to trade. However, the pattern of advantage is determined differently: source countries with larger fishing capacity are more likely to export fish, while source countries with lower fishing capacity are more likely to sign agreements.
Keywords: International fisheries; access agreements; international trade; empirical (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q22 Q27 F13 F14 F18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-int and nep-res
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adl:wpaper:2017-11
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