The Demand Bargaining Set: General Characterization and Application to Majority Games

Massimo Morelli () and Maria Montero

No 11, Economics Working Papers from Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science

Abstract: The cooperative solution concept introduced here, the demand bargaining set, contains the core and is included in the Zhou bargaining set, eliminating the “dominated” coalition structures. The demand vectors belonging to the demand bargaining set are self-stable. In the class of constant-sum homogeneous weighted majority games the demand bargaining set is non-empty and predicts a unique demand vector, namely a proportional distribution within minimal winning coalitions. The noncooperative implementation of the demand bargaining set is obtained for all the games that satisfy the one-stage property.

Keywords: Bargaining Sets; Stable Demands; Undominated Coalition Structures; Weighted Majority Games; Proportional Payoffs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2001-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 42(1) 2003, 146-64

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